A dynamic spatial model of conflict escalation by Baudains, P et al.
A Dynamic Spatial Model of Conflict Escalation
P. Baudains ∗† H. M. Fry ‡ T. P. Davies ∗† A. G. Wilson ‡ S.R. Bishop †
August 10, 2015
Abstract
In both historical and modern conflicts, space plays a critical role in how interactions occur over time.
Despite its importance, the spatial distribution of adversaries has often been neglected in mathematical
models of conflict. In this paper, we propose an entropy-maximising spatial interaction method for
disaggregating the impact of space, employing a general notion of ‘threat’ between two adversaries.
This approach addresses a number of limitations that are associated with partial diﬀerential equation
approaches to spatial disaggregation. We use this method to spatially disaggregate the Richardson
model of conflict escalation, and then explore the resulting model with both analytical and numerical
treatments. A bifurcation is identified that dramatically influences the resulting spatial distribution of
conflict and is shown to persist under a range of model specifications. Implications of this finding for
real-world conflicts are discussed.
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1 Introduction
The spatial distribution of resources can have a significant eﬀect on the actions of adversaries during conflict.
Mathematical models that incorporate such factors can help in the consideration of strategies for deployment
over space or the forecasting of those geographic regions that may be more at risk. Historically, dynamic
ecological models of interacting populations have been used extensively to investigate conflict between ad-
versaries, but have typically neglected the influence of space. Examples include the Richardson model of
conflict escalation (Richardson, 1960), the Lanchester equations of attrition warfare (Lanchester, 1916), and
the Lotka-Volterra model for predator-prey interactions, originally described as an ecological model in Lotka
(1925). Since these landmark publications, a number of studies have sought to develop these models and
insights have been obtained into diﬀerent types of conflict (Deitchman, 1962; Jackson et al., 1978; Zinnes
and Muncaster, 1984; Intriligator and Brito, 1988; Karmeshu et al., 1990; Saperstein, 2007; Liebovitch et al.,
2008; Blank et al., 2008; Atkinson et al., 2011; Qubbaj and Muneepeerakul, 2012; Rojas-Pacheco et al., 2013;
Kress and MacKay, 2014), but explicit modelling of spatial interactions is rarely considered. By neglecting
space, it is implicitly assumed that total resource levels are the main drivers that govern the system, but it
may be that, in fact, the distribution of resources has a material eﬀect on real-life outcomes.
When models of conflict have incorporated some form of spatial dependence, it is often modelled by adding
reaction-diﬀusion dynamics to a system of ordinary diﬀerential equations (Epstein, 1997; Brantingham et al.,
2012). Some have argued, however, that reaction-diﬀusion models may not always be the most appropriate
method of accounting for such dependence (Durrett and Levin, 1994; Ilachinski, 2004; Gonza´lez and Villena,
2011). Diﬀusive dynamics, in which conflict is modelled as spreading from areas of high concentration to
low, may not always correspond to real-world spatial interactions.
Other studies have incorporated other mechanisms, such as advection, in an eﬀort to construct more
realistic models (Protopopescu and Santoro, 1989; Short et al., 2010a,b; Pitcher, 2010; Keane, 2011). Such
models still rely on a number of restrictive assumptions. For instance, they require smooth dependent
variables in space in order to ensure existence of second partial derivatives. Since data is often aggregated
into discrete geographic areas, this requires the construction of kernel density estimators, which, in turn,
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requires further modelling assumptions regarding the choice of estimator and associated parameters.
Discontinuities in space are also likely to be encountered, for example via physical (rivers and roads) or
geopolitical boundaries, which can contradict assumptions of smooth dependent variables (although some
techniques have been developed to account for such eﬀects (Smith et al., 2010)).
Finally, solutions to partial diﬀerential equations require the specification of spatial boundary conditions,
which, in many cases, may be diﬃcult to define if the spatial area of interest has no natural boundary that
contains the dynamics.
To address these limitations, we propose an entropy maximising approach to the spatial disaggregation of
conflict models. We demonstrate this approach by disaggregating the Richardson model of conflict escalation.
In what follows, we first outline the Richardson model before presenting this disaggregation. We then consider
the resulting model in a range of scenarios. Starting with highly simplified scenarios, for which the behaviour
of the model can be analytically determined, the complexity of the model is increased by considering higher-
dimensional phase spaces and corresponding parameter spaces. This leads to an understanding of the model’s
behaviour and implications in more general scenarios.
2 The Richardson model
The Richardson model was initially conceived as a model of arms expenditure between two nations in the lead
up to war (Richardson, 1960). As a consequence, the dependent variables, given here by p and q, were taken
to be the levels of military expenditure of two nations. The model is given by the following two-dimensional
linear system of ordinary diﬀerential equations:
dp
dt
= p˙ = −σ1p+ ρ1q + ϵ1 (1)
dq
dt
= q˙ = ρ2p− σ2q + ϵ2,
where parameters σ1 and σ2 determine the influence on the change in military expenditure proportional to
existing expenditure, and ρ1 and ρ2 determine the rate of the action-reaction relationship between the two
adversaries. The terms ϵ1 and ϵ2 are those associated with external grievances. Typically, ρ1 and ρ2 will
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be positive, as an increase in military defences of one side spurs increased defences of the other. σ1 and σ2
are also typically positive: Richardson hypothesised that there will be some inhibition associated with an
increasing military arsenal, perhaps through pressures placed upon the government of each nation by their
electorate. The inhibition terms may also be interpreted as the rate of depreciation of existing arms.
Richardson showed that if ρ1ρ2 < σ1σ2 then there is a unique positive equilibrium in the plane, which
is globally attractive. In this case, p and q are constrained more by their internal dynamics (with intensity
given by the parameters σ1 and σ2) than by the interaction terms (with intensity given by ρ1 and ρ2). If
this condition does not hold, then the equilibrium is a saddle, and escalatory dynamics such as arms races
can occur.
It has been argued elsewhere that the model represents a very general conflict escalation process (Zinnes
and Muncaster, 1984) and, as such, can be considered to model a wide range of potential systems in which
two adversaries are subject to retaliation (see also Liebovitch et al. (2008), who present a nonlinear variant
of Richardson’s model to consider general conflict processes). Consequently, for the remainder of this article,
the dependent variables p and q are taken to be a more general and abstract measure of hostility between
two adversaries.
Although Richardson’s model was not spatially explicit, he was highly interested in spatial and geographic
problems such as the measurement of borders and population density (Richardson (1961); see also Mandelbrot
(1967)). He also considered how such measures might influence conflict in his work on deadly quarrels
(Richardson, 1952).
3 A spatially-explicit Richardson model
Spatial interaction models have been employed previously within both static and dynamic spatial models
to consider retail systems (Harris and Wilson, 1978; Wilson, 2008); international migration (Dennett and
Wilson, 2013); rioting (Davies et al., 2013); international trade (Fry and Wilson, 2012) and ecological
dynamics (Wilson, 2006). They have been empirically shown to provide plausible accounts of spatial processes
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for many of these examples.
To begin, we consider a two-dimensional manifold M, on which conflict between two adversaries takes
place. Suppose that one adversary is located at the points x1,x2, ...,xN ∈ M, while their opponent is
located at y1,y2, ...,yM ∈M. In other words, each adversary is discretely distributed over M, perhaps due
to the positions of military bases, allied settlements, or gang safe houses, depending on the application of
the model.
In order to maintain generality, the dependent variables for the system are taken to be general measures
of conflict, hostility or defence capability of each adversary. In the disaggregated system, these measures are
tracked individually at each location. In other words, the variables to be considered are p1, p2, ..., pN , which
correspond to levels of hostility associated with locations x1,x2, ...,xN , respectively, and q1, q2, ..., qN , which
correspond to levels of hostility associated with locations y1,y2, ...,yM , respectively.
It is assumed similar mechanisms to the original Richardson model influence the variable pj , for each
index j. That is, p˙j depends on three terms as in equation (1): the action-reaction term that itself depends
on the adversary who is distributed over the manifold, representing the retaliatory dynamics driving the
system; a measure of inhibition, representing each adversary’s natural inclination to avoid conflict; and
external grievances that may be present at xj .
The action-reaction term within the equation for p˙j is assumed to depend on the variables q1, q2, ..., qM ,
representing the level of hostility of their adversary. In particular, it is proposed that this term is given by
a weighted sum of these terms, with corresponding weighting factors wlj ∈ [0, 1], which serve to specify the
proportion of ql that contributes to the action-reaction dynamics of pj for every l and j. These weighting
factors will be modelled explicitly in what follows. Following Richardson, the second term, representing
inhibition mechanisms, is taken to be proportional to the hostility pj and the third term, representing
external grievances associated with the hostility pj , is taken to be a constant.
With an analogous equation for q˙l, for some index l, but with corresponding action-reaction weighting
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factors denoted by vjl, the spatial Richardson model is
p˙j = −σ1pj + ρ1
M∑
l=1
qlwlj + ϵ1ιj , j = 1, ..., N, (2)
q˙l = ρ2
N∑
j=1
pjvjl − σ2ql + ϵ2κl, l = 1, ...,M,
where, as before, ρ1 and ρ2 specify the intensity of the action-reaction dynamics, σ1 and σ2 specify the
extent to which there is inhibition to growth in hostility, and ϵ1ιj and ϵ2κl are the levels of external grievance
associated with pj and ql, respectively.
Since the model is a disaggregation of the full Richardson model, it is assumed that the dynamics of the
aggregated system—that is, the system defined by the hostility of each adversary as a whole—follow the
original Richardson dynamics. Thus, it is assumed that
N∑
j=1
wlj = 1, l = 1, ...,M ;
M∑
l=1
vjl = 1, j = 1, ..., N, (3)
and that
N∑
j=1
ιj = 1,
M∑
l=1
κl = 1. (4)
Setting p =
∑N
j=1 pj and q =
∑M
l=1 ql, it can be seen that the aggregation of the system in equation (2),
obtained by summing the derivatives of each component, is equivalent to the system in equation (1).
In order to derive an explicit form for the model, further assumptions are required. It is assumed that
ιj = 1/N and κl = 1/M , so that external grievances impact pj and ql similarly over diﬀerent values of j and
l. This assumption can be easily generalised, although such generalisations are not considered in the present
article.
Equation (3) and the requirement that the weightings wlj ∈ [0, 1] imply that the problem of finding
an explicit analytical expression for wlj is equivalent to finding a probability distribution describing the
probability that xj is the location towards which a resource at yl (with hostility ql) will exert its threat. To
do this, we employ the principal of maximum entropy (Wilson, 1970; Senior, 1979) to find the probability
distribution that is least biased with respect to some modelling assumptions, or constraints, which we state
in what follows.
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To specify these constraints, we define a metric d : M ×M → R such that, for any two locations
xj ,yl ∈ M, d(xj ,yl) is a measure of impedance, distance, or travel cost between xj and yl. We fix the
average cost of exerting threat in the system, so that:
M∑
l=1
N∑
j=1
wljd(xj ,yl) = c1, (5)
for some positive constant c1. This constraint formulates Tobler’s first law of geography in the model, forcing
nearer things to be more related than farther things (Tobler, 1970) and, therefore, more threat to be exerted
between opponents that are nearby.
Additionally, we assume that there is some incentive bj in addition to the cost of transporting threat
to xj from yl (as given by d(xj ,yl)) that can be oﬀset against d(xj ,yl). It is assumed that targets with a
higher threat incentive can have threat exerted on them even when the cost of exerting this threat is high.
Similarly to equation (5), we fix the average cost of exerting threat in the system, oﬀsetting the added benefit
that might be obtained by the incentive measure, as
M∑
l=1
N∑
j=1
wlj(d(xj ,yl)− bj) = c2, (6)
for some constant c2.
Finally, we assume that the incentive to exert threat on xj is proportional to the logarithm of the hostility
pj . Thus, locations xj with higher levels of hostility will provide more incentive for threats to travel longer
distances as these locations will represent more of a threat to opponents at yl. A logarithm function is used
so that this added incentive has diminishing returns to scale. Using equation (5) and equation (6), we obtain:
M∑
l=1
N∑
j=1
wlj ln pj = c3, (7)
for some constant c3. This constraint is often employed in similar production-constrained spatial interaction
models to reflect the added benefit associated with interacting with a particular target (Wilson, 1967, 2008;
Davies et al., 2013).
Following Wilson (1970), the values for the weightings wlj for l = 1, ...,M and j = 1, ..., N can be
determined by analogy with a problem in information theory, where a system comprised of a large number
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of very small distinct units originating at locations xj must be assigned to destinations yl. In previous
applications of the model, the individual units that flow have included money and people; however, for the
present purposes, in which a general model of conflict is sought, the quantity flowing from i to j is assumed
to be a conceptual measure of ‘threat’. This is a novel interpretation of the following well-known derivation
of the model, and, as will be demonstrated, enables a link between this modelling framework and a range of
conflict models, such as the spatial Richardson model to which it is applied here.
When framed in this light, it can be shown that the most likely outcome for wlj may be determined via
maximisation of the function:
S = −
M∑
l=1
N∑
j=1
wlj lnwlj , (8)
where S is the sum of the Shannon entropy for probability distributions {wlj}j=1,2,...,N for l = 1, 2, ...,M
(see Senior (1979) for more detail), subject to constraints in equations (3), (5) and (7). Using the method
of Lagrangian multipliers, this obtains
wlj =
pαj e
−βd(xj ,yl)∑N
j′=1 p
α
j′e
−βd(xj′ ,yl)
, (9)
for parameters α and β, and where the subscript j′ has been introduced to distinguish it from j. The
weighting wlj determines the extent to which ql influences the reactive retaliatory behaviour of pj . It can
be interpreted as a weighted comparison of pj against pj′ for j′ = 1, 2, ...N , with each weighted according to
the distance to the adversary at yl.
By an analogous derivation, a similar expression may be derived for the retaliatory eﬀect on ql from pj ,
with corresponding weightings vjl, given by
vjl =
qγl e
−δd(yl,xj)∑M
l′=1 q
γ
l′e
−δd(yl′ ,xj)
, (10)
for further new parameters γ and δ, and subscript l′.
Returning to equation (2), the spatially-explicit Richardson model for two adversaries discretely dis-
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tributed over a manifold M with associated distance metric d :M×M→ R is, therefore, given by
p˙j = −σ1pj + ρ1
M∑
l=1
ql
pαj e
−βd(xj ,yl)∑N
j′ p
α
j′e
−βd(xj′ ,yl)
+
ϵ1
N
(11)
q˙l = −σ2ql + ρ2
N∑
j=1
pj
qγl e
−δd(yl,xj)∑M
l′ q
γ
l′e
−δd(yl′ ,xj)
+
ϵ2
M
,
for j = 1, 2, ..., N and l = 1, 2, ...,M .
Equation (11) extends the version of Richardson’s model in equation (1) by explicitly incorporating the
impact of space via the metric d. Advantages over other methods of modelling spatial conflict processes
(such as partial diﬀerential equations or multi-agent simulations) include the explicit and relatively general
assumptions required to derive the model (without a reliance on the continuity of the locations of adversaries),
together with its concise analytical form, enabling the model to be interrogated analytically to obtain insights.
Since few restrictions have been placed upon the distance metric, the model can be applied to a range of
conflict processes involving retaliatory dynamics and spatial interaction.
4 Analysis
As a first step, some simplifying assumptions are made. In what follows, a reduced parameter space is
considered in which α = γ = 1, δ = β, and σ1 = σ2 = σ. These imply: that p˙ and q˙ depend linearly on p
and q respectively in both the numerator and denominator of the action-reaction term (which combine to
form a nonlinear function); that both adversaries react to impedance on M at the same rate; and that both
adversaries react to internal constraints at the same rate. In accordance with Richardson’s original model,
the remaining parameters ρ1, ρ2, σ1, σ2, ϵ1 and ϵ2 are set to be nonnegative. The parameter β is also taken
to be nonnegative, to ensure that distance plays a diminishing role in the values of the weighting factors wlj
and vjl.
It is possible to simplify the model further, this time at no cost to the generalisability of the model, by
rescaling the system. Indeed, substituting
t =
1
σ
tˆ, ρi = σρˆi, ϵi = σϵˆi, (12)
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into the model eliminates the parameter σ. Relabelling the parameters by removing hats, and taking into
account the other simplifying assumptions above, the model in equation (11) becomes
p˙j = −pj + ρ1
M∑
l=1
ql
pje−βd(xj ,yl)∑N
j′ pj′e
−βd(xj′ ,yl)
+
ϵ1
N
(13)
q˙l = −ql + ρ2
N∑
j=1
pj
qle−βd(yl,xj)∑M
l′ ql′e
−βd(yl′ ,xj)
+
ϵ2
M
.
There are five parameters in equation (13) whose eﬀect on the system dynamics requires exploration. ρ1
and ρ2 are analogous to the action-reaction terms for each adversary in the original Richardson model and
are anticipated to play a similar role. That is, as they increase, the system is expected to become more
unstable. A similar comparison can be made for ϵ1 and ϵ2, which are external grievance terms, and are
anticipated to play a role in the magnitude of resulting solution curves. The parameter β, however, has
no analogy within the original Richardson model. Its inclusion in equation (13) is as a direct result of the
spatial disaggregation.
In the sections that follow, the model in equation (13) is considered in a series of idealised scenarios and,
later, more complex scenarios, from which important insights are obtained. Initially, the dimension of the
dependent variable, given by N +M , is minimised, since low dimensional non-linear systems are often the
easiest to analyse. To this end, in Section 4.1, the model is first considered with N +M = 3, which is the
lowest dimension of the dependent variable for which the model admits non-trivial spatial disaggregation of
conflict dynamics (N = M = 1 leads to Richardson’s original system). In Section 4.2, a scenario is considered
with N +M = 4, and then, in Section 4.3, N +M = 8. In Section 4.4 the model is investigated in a large
number of dimensions, using the findings of the more simple scenarios to instruct the analysis.
4.1 A three-dimensional scenario
The first scenario to be considered is the simplest with non-trivial spatial disaggregation. Without loss of
generality, this is given by the case when N = 2 and M = 1, so that one adversary is distributed over two
locations—at positions x1,x2 ∈M—and the other adversary remains at just one location, given by y1 ∈M.
This scenario can be thought of as one step below a macro-level model in which the spatial dependence is
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completely aggregated (and therefore given by the original Richardson model).
In order to fully specify the model, the metric d is defined. A metric is required that distinguishes between
the locations x1 and x2, and, for analytic simplicity, is set here so that
d(x1,y1) = 0, d(x2,y1) = 1,
so that the distance between x1 and y1 is negligible, whilst y1 and x2 are diﬀerent locations on M. The
resulting three-dimensional system can be written as
p˙1 = −p1 + ρ1
q1p1
p1 + p2e−β
+
ϵ1
2
p˙2 = −p2 + ρ1
q1p2e−β
p1 + p2e−β
+
ϵ1
2
(14)
q˙1 = −q1 + ρ2(p1 + p2) + ϵ2.
Equation (3) ensures that the dynamics of the variables p = p1+ p2 and q = q1 are given by equation (1)
and, consequently, linear stability analysis of the original Richardson model can be utilised. The aggregated
system converges to a stable equilibrium if, and only if,
ρ1ρ2 < 1, (15)
(which is consistent with the corresponding condition for equation (1) since the parameters σ1σ2 have been
rescaled to one) and this equilibrium is given by
p = p1 + p2 =
ϵ1 + ρ1ϵ2
1− ρ1ρ2
, q = q1 =
ϵ2 + ρ2ϵ1
1− ρ1ρ2
. (16)
Equation (16) defines a line in three-dimensional (p1, p2, q1)-space as the intersection of two planes. If the
stability criteria are satisfied then the system converges to this line. If ρ1ρ2 > 1, then the aggregated system
is unstable and almost all solution curves diverge to infinity. For the remainder of this section, it is assumed
that ρ1ρ2 < 1, so that all solution curves in the aggregated system converge to a stable equilibrium, and all
solution curves in the three-dimensional system in equation (14) converge to the line defined by equation
(16).
11
It remains to find the dynamics of the system on this line, representing the behaviour of the system that
is due to spatial disaggregation. This can be found through a change of variables which separates the model
into two components: the original linear Richardson system, which is well-understood, and the unknown
dynamics brought about by spatial disaggregation. To this end, the variables
p = p1 + p2, r = p1 − p2,
are introduced. Re-writing the system in equation (14) in terms of the variables p, q and r, leads to
p˙ = −p+ ρ1q + ϵ1 (17)
q˙ = −q + ρ2p+ ϵ2 (18)
r˙ = −r + ρ1q
p(1− e−β) + r(1 + e−β)
p(1 + e−β) + r(1− e−β)
, (19)
which isolates the unexplored dynamics on the line defined by equation (16) from those of the overall
aggregated system. Equations (17) and (18) correspond to the Richardson model in equation (1) with
σ1 = σ2 = 1, and do not depend on r. The unexplored dynamics captured by equation (19), which
encapsulates the eﬀect of spatial disaggregation, can be considered as a distinct system for given values of p
and q. This system is undefined when
r = −
(
1 + e−β
1− e−β
)
p, (20)
and so the analysis presented here is restricted to cases in which this condition does not occur. Indeed,
for equality in equation (20), r and p must have opposite signs; however, since d(x1,y1) < d(x2,y1), and
since distance is hypothesised to have a diminishing eﬀect on the resulting hostility, it may be assumed that
p1 > p2 for p > 0 and, therefore, that r > 0. Thus, this condition is assumed not to occur in scenarios of
interest.
There are two real equilibrium points to the one-dimensional system defined by equation (19), given by
r± = −
1
2
(
1 + e−β
1− e−β
)
(p− ρ1q)±
1
2
√(
1 + e−β
1− e−β
)2
(p− ρ1q)2 + 4ρ1pq. (21)
Since 4ρ1pq > 0, r− < 0 and r+ > 0 and thus r+ is a unique positive equilibrium.
12
The local stability of r+ in the one-dimensional system defined by equation (19) (whilst treating p and
q as constants) depends on the sign of
dr˙
dr
= −1 + ρ1pq
(1 + e−β)2 − (1− e−β)2
(p(1 + e−β) + r(1− e−β))2
,
at r = r+. It can be shown via algebraic manipulation that
dr˙
dr
∣∣∣∣∣
r+
< 0,
and, therefore, that the positive equilibrium is locally attractive. Furthermore, since the only other equilib-
rium at r− < 0 is the only point at which r˙ can change sign, r+ is an attractive equilibrium for r > 0.
Equation (21) enables the investigation of how the parameters influence the value of r+, and therefore
influence the resulting spatial distribution of hostility. The parameters ρ1, ρ2, ϵ1 and ϵ2 have a similar
interpretation on the aggregate equilibrium value given in equation (16); however, the parameter β does not
appear in the original model as it results from the spatial disaggregation. Analytically, it can be shown from
equation (21) that
lim
β→0
r+ = 0, lim
β→∞
r+ = ρ1q. (22)
The value of r+ in equation (21) is plotted in Figure 1 against β with the values of the other parameters as
given. The parameter β determines the extent to which hostility is distributed over the locations x1 and x2,
and therefore captures the strength of the spatial dependence in the system. As β → 0, the system becomes
aggregated, regardless of the spatial distribution, and the hostility levels in the two locations are equal.
As β → ∞, r+ reaches its maximum and the system becomes increasingly local: each location interacts
only with their closest adversary. The value of β specifies the accessibility of the space, and will require
appropriate calibration in the application of the model to conflict scenarios.
4.2 A four-dimensional scenario
In this section, the complexity of the model is increased by considering a scenario in which each adversary
is located over two distinct locations. Suppose that the locations x1,x2,y1,y2 ∈ M are associated with
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Figure 1: The value of r+ for diﬀerent values of β. The parameter values used are ϵ1 = ϵ2 = 1, ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.5.
hostility measures p1, p2, q1, q2 ∈ R, respectively. For analytic simplicity, the distance metric d is chosen to
consist of zeros and ones. In this case, the 2× 2 matrix D given by Djl = d(xj ,yl) is defined to be
D =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝ 0 1
1 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ ,
so that adversaries are distributed identically on M. The two adversaries can be thought of as being both
distributed across two spatial zones where within-zonal impedance is negligible. In this scenario, the model
in equation (13) becomes
p˙1 = −p1 + ρ1
q1p1
p1 + p2e−β
+ ρ1
q2p1e−β
p1e−β + p2
+
ϵ1
2
p˙2 = −p2 + ρ1
q1p2e−β
p1 + p2e−β
+ ρ1
q2p2
p1e−β + p2
+
ϵ1
2
(23)
q˙1 = −q1 + ρ2
p1q1
q1 + q2e−β
+ ρ2
p2q1e−β
q1e−β + q2
+
ϵ2
2
q˙2 = −q2 + ρ2
p1q2e−β
q1 + q2e−β
+ ρ2
p2q2
q1e−β + q2
+
ϵ2
2
.
Similarly to the three dimensional case, the dynamics of the original Richardson model can be extracted from
this system by a change of variables, leading to a reduced dynamical system to which the system converges
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for ρ1ρ2 < 1. The following variables are therefore introduced:
p = p1 + p2, r = p1 − p2,
q = q1 + q2, s = q1 − q2.
Substituting these expressions into equation (23), and re-writing the system so that it depends only on p, q,
r and s, obtains
p˙ =− p+ ρ1q + ϵ1 (24)
q˙ =− q + ρ2p+ ϵ2 (25)
r˙ =− r +
ρ1
2
(q + s)
(1− e−β)p+ (1 + e−β)r
(1 + e−β)p+ (1− e−β)r
+
ρ1
2
(q − s)
(e−β − 1)p+ (1 + e−β)r
(1 + e−β)p+ (e−β − 1)r
(26)
s˙ =− s+
ρ2
2
(p+ r)
(1− e−β)q + (1 + e−β)s
(1 + e−β)q + (1− e−β)s
+
ρ2
2
(p− r)
(e−β − 1)q + (1 + e−β)s
(1 + e−β)q + (e−β − 1)s
. (27)
Equations (24) and (25) are equivalent to the original Richardson system with σ1 = σ2 = 1, whilst equations
(26) and (27) represent the added dynamics and complexity that is due to spatial disaggregation. For
ρ1ρ2 < 1, the system converges to the plane defined by the equilibrium of the aggregated system, given by
p =
ρ1ϵ2 + ϵ1
1− ρ1ρ2
, q =
ρ2ϵ1 + ϵ2
1− ρ1ρ2
. (28)
For the remainder of the section, it is assumed that ρ1ρ2 < 1 and that a suﬃcient amount of time has passed
so that p and q have reached their equilibrium values, and the unexplored dynamics of the system are given
by equations (26) and (27), where p and q are constants given in equation (28).
The system is undefined when
r = ±
(
1 + e−β
1− e−β
)
p,
or when
s = ±
(
1 + e−β
1− e−β
)
q.
15
Consequently, the analysis presented here is restricted to solutions that do not cross this region in phase
space. For a value of β > 0, the lines at which the system is undefined generate a rectangle in rs-space
surrounding the origin. Considering possible solutions within this rectangle, it can be observed that the
origin is an equilibrium, representing the point at which p1 = p2 and q1 = q2 and thus where hostility is
equally distributed amongst the diﬀerent locations in space.
Linearisation of the planar system in equations (26) and (27) about the origin leads to⎛
⎜⎜⎝ r˙
s˙
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝ −1 + ρ1(1− η
2) ρ1η
ρ2η −1 + ρ2(1− η2)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎝ r
s
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ , (29)
where
η =
(
1− e−β
1 + e−β
)
, (30)
which is dependent on β > 0 in such a way so that 0 < η < 1. The eigenvalues of the system in equation
(29) are
λ± = −1 +
1
2
(ρ1 + ρ2)
(
1− η2
)
±
1
2
√
(ρ1 − ρ2)
2 (1− η2)2 + 4η2ρ1ρ2. (31)
For clarity, a simplified scenario in which ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ is first considered. This implies that the intensity
of the action-reaction dynamics for each adversary is equal. The eigenvalues simplify to
λ± = −1 + ρ(1− η
2 ± η). (32)
Considering first λ−,
λ− = −1 + ρ(1− η
2 − η) < −1 + ρ < 0, (33)
since η > 0 and 0 < ρ < 1. Thus one eigenvalue is always negative and the condition for stability depends
solely on the eigenvalue λ+. In particular, the equilibrium is stable when
λ+ = −1 + ρ(1− η
2 + η) < 0, (34)
which occurs when
ρ <
1
1− η2 + η
=
(eβ + 1)2
e2β + 4eβ − 1
. (35)
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Considering the right hand side of equation (35),
0 <
(eβ + 1)2
e2β + 4eβ − 1
<
e2β + 2eβ + 1 + 2(eβ − 1)
e2β + 4eβ − 1
= 1, (36)
and, thus, for ρ < 1, it is possible that the equilibrium can be either stable or unstable, depending on the
value of ρ in comparison to the value ρ¯ given by
ρ¯(β) =
(eβ + 1)2
e2β + 4eβ − 1
. (37)
A bifurcation occurs as ρ increases above ρ¯, and ρ¯ is said to be a bifurcation point.
In Figure 2, the function ρ¯(β) for β > 0 is shown, in order to demonstrate how the bifurcation point ρ¯
varies with the parameter β. The minimum of ρ¯ occurs at
βmin = ln 3 ≈ 1.1, ρ¯(βmin) ≈ 0.8. (38)
The existence of the bifurcation has important implications for the model. Given an appropriate value for β,
Figure 2: The bifurcation point ρ¯ plotted against β.
for relatively small values of ρ < 1, corresponding to scenarios in which retaliatory dynamics are weak, then
hostile activity is likely to be evenly distributed in space. However, if ρ < 1 is close to one, corresponding to
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scenarios with stronger retaliation and therefore higher levels of aggression, then hostile activity is likely to
be more unevenly distributed, even if the aggregate system converges to a stable equilibrium.
Taking the Taylor expansion of the planar system given by equations (26) and (27) about the origin, and
retaining terms up to third order, leads to⎛
⎜⎜⎝ r˙
s˙
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝ (−1 + ρ− ρη
2)r + ρηs+ ρη
2
p2 (1− η
2)r3 − ρηp2 (1− η
2)r2s
(−1 + ρ− ρη2)s+ ρηr + ρη
2
q2 (1− η
2)s3 − ρηq2 (1− η
2)s2r
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ , (39)
which can be used to identify the existence of two stable equilibria for ρ > ρ¯, some solution curves of which
are shown in Figure 3 for ρ < ρ¯ and ρ > ρ¯.
Figure 3: Selected solution curves of the system in equation (39) for two diﬀerent values of ρ. In a), ρ = 0.7,
whilst in b), ρ = 0.803. All other parameter values are such that ρ¯ = 0.801.
Supposing that r = s and ϵ1 = ϵ2 in equation (39), leads to
r˙ =
(
−1 + ρ(1− η2 + η)
)
r −
(
ρη
p2
(1− η2)(1− η)
)
r3. (40)
If ϵ1 = ϵ2, then the system in equation (39) is symmetric and equilibria of the system in equation (40)
will correspond to equilibria of the system in equation (39). Equilibria of the system in equation (40) occur
when either r = 0 or when
r2 =
1− ρ(1− η2 + η)
ρη
p2 (1− η
2)(η − 1)
, (41)
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which has solutions only when the right-hand side of equation (41) is greater than zero. It can be shown
that this occurs when
ρ >
1
1− η2 + η
,
corresponding to the condition for the loss of stability in the equilibrium at the origin. In Figure 4, the
equilibrium values for the system in (40) are shown for diﬀerent values of ρ. As ρ increases beyond ρ¯, two
stable equilibria appear, with values given by
r± = ±p
(
1− ρ(1− η2 + η)
ρη(1− η2)(η − 1)
) 1
2
. (42)
Figure 4: Equilibria of equation (40) for varying values of ρ.
A bifurcation of the system in equations (26) and (27) at the equilibrium of the rs-plane has been shown
to exist in the special case when ρ1 = ρ2. It is important to determine whether the same bifurcation occurs
when ρ1 ̸= ρ2. This is because conflict scenarios to which the model may be applied will often be asymmetric:
each adversary may adopt diﬀerent tactics, resulting in diﬀerent retaliatory mechanisms and therefore result
in diﬀerent action-reaction parameters, as given by ρ1 and ρ2. In Figure 5 the stability of the origin of the
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rs-plane is shown for values of ρ1 and ρ2 between 0.5 and 1, and for three diﬀerent values of β. In this figure,
green represents stability of the equilibrium, and blue represents instability. The bifurcation can be observed
in the transition from stability to instability in each of the three cases considered, across diﬀerent values
for β. This figure confirms that the identified bifurcation is persistent under variation of the parameter
values. Furthermore, the change in the bifurcation point appears to be smooth with varying parameters: an
increase in ρ1 moves the bifurcation point in the direction of decreasing ρ2. This suggests that the system
requires some total sum of aggression, as determined by a combination of the parameters ρ1 and ρ2, before
the equilibrium at the origin of the rs-plane becomes unstable.
Figure 5: Stability of the equilibrium at the origin of the rs-plane for ρ1 ∈ [0.5, 1) and ρ2 ∈ [0.5, 1) and for
β = 0.5, β = 1, and β = 2.
The four-dimensional model given in equation (23) has been shown to exhibit richer behaviour than the
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three-dimensional case. By investigating the stability of the most natural equilibrium point in the system,
given by the point at which hostility levels are equally distributed over adversaries, a supercritical pitchfork
bifurcation has been identified in the case of a symmetric system, which can occur within a feasible region
of the parameter space. It has been shown that a bifurcation persists for asymmetric conflicts, which we
suspect to be of pitchfork form. In what follows, further properties of the bifurcation are sought that serve to
remove any suspicions of reliance on some of the limiting assumptions employed in this section. In particular,
the model is considered with diﬀerent distance metrics and in higher-dimensional scenarios.
4.3 An eight-dimensional scenario
The bifurcation identified in Section 4.2 may have existed as a consequence of the particular form of the
distance metric or as a result of the number of dimensions used. In this section, two eight-dimensional
scenarios with N = M = 4 are explored, and the stability of the most natural equilibrium as system-wide
aggression increases is investigated. Doubling the dimension of the model leads to a reduction in analytical
tractability. As a consequence, numerical simulation of the model is used to explore the range of potential
scenarios in what follows. Numerical simulations are performed using the Runge-Kutta method for temporal
discretisation. It was found that step sizes of 0.1 produced simulation results in agreement with much smaller
step sizes as well as in agreement with the analytical results presented in the previous sections.
The two scenarios are constructed by defining the 4 × 4 matrices D(1) and D(2) where D(i)jl = d(xj ,yl)
for i = 1, 2 and are given by
D(1) =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, D(2) =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 1 2 3
1 0 1 2
2 1 0 1
3 2 1 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
. (43)
D(1) defines a scenario that is a natural extension to the example in Section 4.2. It is assumed that,
instead of adversaries being located across two zones, they are instead located across four zones. In this
case, impedance within the same zone is negligible, whilst any two distinct zones are a significant distance
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from each other. D(2) defines a scenario in which a diﬀerent spatial structure is imposed on the system. In
this case, since the distance between j and l is determined by |j − l| for j, l = 1, 2, 3, 4, consecutive zones
can be considered to be near to each other in space, and non-consecutive zones farther apart. In contrast to
the previous example, the strength of inter-zone interaction now varies according to the particular pairing
in question.
Figure 6(a) shows two runs of the model with distance metric D(1) and Figure 6(b) shows two runs of
the model with distance metric D(2). The two diﬀerent runs of the model are chosen to correspond to two
scenarios in which the level of aggression in the system, determined by the parameters ρ1 and ρ2, lies on
either side of some characteristic level of aggression, denoted by ρˆ. The value of ρˆ is obtained by utilising the
results of the previous section, in which it was found that, when two adversaries with equal aggression have
parameters that exceed 0.8, a bifurcation occurs. For each scenario considered, the sum of the two solution
curves in each zone is plotted for each model run and, in both cases, a bifurcation is observed: on either side
of the characteristic value of ρˆ, a qualitatively diﬀerent equilibrium is obtained.
In the case of Figure 6(a), prior to the bifurcation, analogously to the scenario studied in Section 4.2,
the system converges to an equilibrium which is constant across each zone. Since the aggregated system is
given by the original Richardson system, this equilibrium is given by
pj =
ρ1ϵ2 + ϵ1
4(1− ρ1ρ2)
, ql =
ρ2ϵ1 + ϵ2
4(1− ρ1ρ2)
, (44)
for j, l = 1, 2, 3, 4. After the bifurcation occurs, solution curves in zone 1 converge to a larger equilibrium
value and solution curves in the other zones decrease to compensate for the increase in zone 1. In performing
both numerical simulations, initial conditions in zone 1 were perturbed slightly to ensure the solution curves
did not rest on the potentially unstable equilibrium in equation (44). We conjecture that it is for this reason
that hostility levels increase in zone 1, as opposed to any of the other zones.
In Figure 6(b), prior to the bifurcation, the system converges to a natural equilibrium, which, according
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(a) A scenario with distance metric given by D(1).
(b) The same scenario but with distance metric given by D(2).
Figure 6: The sum of the two solution curves in each zone, for two diﬀerent sets of parameter values for
scenarios defined by D(1) and D(2) in equation (43). For the two scenarios, the parameters values are, in
the case of the solid line, ρ1 = 0.75, ρ2 = 0.8, ϵ1 = ϵ2 = 0.4, and β = 1; and, in the case of the dashed line,
ρ1 = 0.8, ρ2 = 0.9, ϵ1 = ϵ2 = 0.4 and β = 1.
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to the numerical simulation, is given by
p1 = 0.21, p2 = 0.25, p3 = 0.25, p4 = 0.21,
q1 = 0.20, q2 = 0.23, q3 = 0.23, q4 = 0.20.
In this case, the hostility levels are not equal across zones. The relative values of the equilibrium emphasise
the spatial structure of the system, since zones 2 and 3 are the zones that are closest to all other zones
and will therefore have the greatest interaction with the other zones. The equilibrium brought about by
the magnitude of aggression in the system being less than ρˆ is not the equilibrium that leads to equality
of resulting hostility across zones, but represents a spatially-weighted equilibrium in which zones that are
closest to other zones naturally contain higher levels of hostility than zones that are farther away.
After the bifurcation, a diﬀerent equilibrium is found and a bifurcation is observed with this diﬀerent
spatial structure. Similarly to the previous example, zone 1 is given perturbed initial conditions to avoid
resting on an unstable equilibrium. However, in this case, rather than zone 1 experiencing a dramatic increase
in hostility levels, zone 2 is the one that increases. It is hypothesised that this is due to the more central
location of zone 2 in comparison to zone 1.
This section has explored the application of the model to two spatial conflict scenarios. The two eight-
dimensional models considered have been shown to contain bifurcation-type behaviour for feasible parameter
values, supporting the hypothesis that the bifurcation identified in Section 4.2 exists in higher dimensions and
in more general spaces. The second example used in this section, in which the spatial structure of the system
is less symmetric, has shown that the most natural equilibrium to which the system appears to converge for
small values of ρ1 and ρ2 is not necessarily an equilibrium with equal hostility levels in each zone, as was the
case for the first example. Instead, the model appears to converge to a spatially-weighted equilibrium, for
which adversaries located closest to other adversaries have a higher resulting level of hostility. The fact that a
spatially-weighted solution is an equilibrium confirms intuition regarding the evolution of spatial conflict: it
is those areas nearest to an adversary that are likely to experience greater levels of conflict over long periods
of time. The existence of the bifurcation, however, and the somewhat unpredictable nature of resulting
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solution curves after the bifurcation has taken place, is a counter-intuitive finding that is generalised further
in the next section.
4.4 A Euclidean large N-dimensional model
Conflicts can occur over large areas and involve participants in a number of distinct locations. So far, only
scenarios involving up to four distinct locations on each side of the conflict have been considered. The model
is now investigated in higher dimensions, demonstrating how the model might be scaled up to consider
conflict occurring over large spatial scales. We test whether there is evidence that the bifurcation identified
in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 exists in these more general scenarios. To this end, the model proposed in this section
contains 100 dimensions, in which N is not necessarily equal to M , and in which a Euclidean distance metric
is used that is distinct from the zonal approach to defining the metrics used previously.
To specify the model, we first setM =
{
(x, y) ∈ R2|0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
}
, so that adversaries are located
within a unit square, and we define d : M ×M → R to be the Euclidean distance metric. One hundred
points inM are uniformly randomly generated and each point is uniformly randomly allocated to either one
of two adversaries. Each point is assigned an initial hostility level equal to one.
The model is then initialised with ϵ = ϵ1/N = ϵ2/M = 0.1, β = 1 and ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ. Solutions of the
system in equation (13) are numerically solved using the Runge-Kutta method. If there exists t¯ > 0 such
that
|pj(t¯+ δt)− pj(t¯)| < 10
−3, |ql(t¯+ δt)− ql(t¯)| < 10
−3, (45)
for j = 1, 2, ..., N and l = 1, 2, ...,M , where δt = 0.1, it is assumed that the system converges to an equilibrium
and that this equilibrium is given by the values of pj(t¯) and ql(t¯) for j = 1, 2, ..., N and l = 1, 2, ...M , where
t = t¯ is the first value of t for which the condition in equation (45) holds.
This process is repeated 100 times, ensuring that a range of random spatial configurations of the model
are tested. For each of these, equilibria for diﬀerent values of ρ are calculated and these are compared using
the skewness of the distribution of equilibrium values over the diﬀerent locations of one of the adversaries.
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That is, for each random spatial configuration k and for each ρ, we calculate
S(k)(ρ) =
1
N
∑N
j=1
(
p(k)j (t¯; ρ)− p¯
(k)(t¯; ρ)
)3
(
1
N
∑N
j=1
(
p(k)j (t¯; ρ)− p¯
(k)(t¯; ρ)
)2)3/2 , (46)
where p¯(k)(t¯; ρ)) is the mean of the equilibrium values p(k)1 (t¯; ρ), p
(k)
2 (t¯; ρ), ..., p
(k)
N (t¯; ρ), for k = 1, 2, ..., 100.
Skewness measures the asymmetry in a set of values. If a set of values are positioned evenly on either
side of their mean, as in a Gaussian curve, the skew will be zero. If there is a long tail of large values in
comparison to the mean then the skew will be positive. Figure 7 shows the distribution of S(k)(ρ) over k as
ρ increases. The solid line represents the mean of the skew statistic over 100 random spatial configurations,
the darker shaded region represents the interquartile range (within which 50% of the values are situated),
and the lighter shaded region represents a region containing 90% of the values of the skew statistic over the
diﬀerent realisations.
Increasing ρ from 0.5 slowly increases the skew statistic from a mean of around zero. As ρ increases
further, after around ρ = 0.8, the value of the skew dramatically increases before settling at a maximum.
For small values of ρ, the values are therefore largely symmetric around the mean, but, as ρ increases, a
small number of increasingly large values start to make a disproportionately large contribution to the value
of the mean. This finding is consistent with the loss of stability of a naturally weighted equilibrium as ρ
increases, providing evidence that a bifurcation persists in this more general setting.
Figures 7(a) and 7(b) show the modelled scenario for two values of ρ, one on each side of a potential
bifurcation. The colour of each point is used to distinguish between the adversaries and the position of each
point represents its location on M. The size of the point is proportional to the corresponding equilibrium
value at that location. As ρ increases, hostility becomes increasing concentrated within a small number of
locations. These locations are towards the centre of the manifold; however, it would be diﬃcult to predict
these locations a priori, since there are many possible locations that might have experienced a similar increase
in hostility. The system with ρ = 0.9 might be considered much more unpredictable and potentially more
dangerous than the system with ρ = 0.8, in which the hostility levels are more balanced over the possible
locations. That is, we get a change from broadly-spread tension to an acute concentration of hostility levels
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Figure 7: The distribution of the skew statistic S(k)(ρ) over 100 random spatial configurations of the model
for diﬀerent values of ρ. Subfigures a) and b) show the equilibrium of one spatial configuration for two
diﬀerent values of ρ.
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in a very small area. In the latter case, the system might be interpreted as being on the brink of a severe
escalation in hostility.
Evidence has been presented that the bifurcation identified in Section 4.2 is persistent under a variety of
parameter values, dimensions and distance metrics. This is a significant result brought about by the spatial
disaggregation of the system, and highlights the types of insights that can be obtained using non-linear
dynamical systems analysis. In particular, according to the model, in spatially dependent systems with
increasing aggression, a qualitative change in the spatial distribution of hostility levels would be anticipated
to be observed, before the entire system becomes unstable and an arms race is initiated (according to the
original Richardson model).
5 Conclusion
We have proposed a novel method for the spatial disaggregation of models of conflict by considering how
an abstract notion of ‘threat’ flows between two adversaries. We have demonstrated this approach by
spatially disaggregating the Richardson model of conflict escalation between two adversaries, and explored
the resulting spatial dependency. A bifurcation was identified that occurs as the magnitude of aggression in
the system increases, and was shown to be persistent under a range of model specifications.
Prior to the bifurcation, for low levels of aggression in the system, solution curves are expected to converge
naturally to an equilibrium which is spatially weighted according to the relative locations of adversaries.
For higher levels of aggression in the system, once the bifurcation has occurred, the spatially weighted
equilibrium becomes unstable and the model converges to a new equilibrium in which hostility levels are
highly concentrated within a few locations. Increasing the level of aggression in the system further can, as
demonstrated in the analysis of Richardson’s original model, lead to an unstable escalating arms race. The
bifurcation hints at a potential early-warning system for real-world conflicts: with increasing aggression,
before the system results in an arms race and hostility increases exponentially, some spatial instability is
expected and particular locations may suddenly experience disproportionate increases in hostility or conflict.
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If vulnerable locations can be identified prior to such increases in aggression, then policy interventions might
seek to reduce tensions in those areas that are likely to experience this initial increase in hostility.
There are a number of avenues for further research. First, the model has been explored within a relatively
restricted region of the phase space. Specifically, it was the geographically weighted equilibrium, which was
attractive for low levels of aggregation in the system, and the deviation from this equilibrium as the level
of aggression increased, that was explored. Since the model is nonlinear, a number of other trajectories
and equilibrium solutions are possible. The analysis was also not extensive with respect to the range of
parameters considered and thus further research might do more to comprehensively explore the parameter
space. Further investigation into the nature of the bifurcation—for example, via a centre manifold reduction
that employs equivariant bifurcation theory or via parameter-following computational techniques—might
lead to a greater understanding as to its emergence and persistence. Finally, the model has not yet been
applied to real-world scenarios in order to assess its empirical validity. Calibration of the model against
empirical data might determine where the system lies in the phase space, and therefore might indicate
whether the system is near to an undesirable bifurcation.
The analysis presented here is a significant contribution to the literature exploring spatial dependency
in models of human conflict. We have presented an alternative method based on the principle of maximum
entropy for capturing such dependency, which alleviates some of the problems that might be encountered
when employing reaction-diﬀusion dynamics. In addition, the spatial disaggregation of the Richardson model
provides an analytical framework to explore a range of conflict scenarios that play out over some manifold
with an associated metric. The identification of a bifurcation that occurs as a result of this disaggregation
highlights the complex dynamics that the model is capable of exhibiting, as well as providing potential
insights into how the spatial distribution of conflict evolves in systems with increasing aggression.
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